We study competition and cooperation among a group of storage units. As the number of energy storages increases, the profit of storages approaches zero under competition. We propose two ways in which storages can achieve the maximum possible profit. The first is a decentralized approach in which storages incur artificial costs that act as incentives for them to behave as a coalition. No private information needs to be exchanged between the storages to calculate the artificial cost function. The second is a centralized approach in which an aggregator coordinates and splits profits with storages in order to achieve maximum profit. We do not assume the nature of the storage-aggregator relationship and derive the necessary conditions for longterm cooperation. We use Nash's axiomatic bargaining problem to model and predict the profit split between aggregator and storages.
I. INTRODUCTION
L ARGE scale introduction energy storage to the grid has the potential to increase the efficiency of the power system from several dimensions: by shifting load from low to high price hours, providing reserves, improving power quality, and even defering capital investments [1] .
Energy storage is of particular importance to the successful integration of renewable sources into the power system as it can be used to mitigate their well-known stochasticity and intermittency.
Storage devices range from large pumped hydro plants to household-level storage units (e.g. Tesla Powerwall [3] ). Although the amount of energy storage in the grid is currently limited, it has recently undergone an unprecedented growth and is expected to continue doing so as costs are driven down [2] . From a storage owner perspective, these devices are capable of arbitraging energy in time, by buying energy at low prices and selling it back later at higher prices.
The optimal utilization of storage devices has been explored under both regulated and competitive market environments. In the former, storage is seen as a public asset that is centrally operated by a system operator (SO) to minimize the operating cost of the system [4] , [5] , [6] , March 10, 2016 DRAFT [7] . The latter entails a decentralized operation where storage devices pursue their own objective (e.g. maximize profits) in a market environment [8] .
Storages have been treated as price-takers if their capacity is insufficient to re-shape the system demand [9] , [10] . However, as the number of storages in the system increases, its impact on the residual demand and electricity prices increases [11] , [12] . Therefore storage units would need to be modeled as price-anticipatory units-units act under the assumption that the other players' actions influence prices.
Most of research have focused on eliminating market power that arise when storages are price-anticipatory [13] . In [14] the authors propose a framework in which storage owners auction physically binding rights to their storage capacity. In [15] , it is proposed for the storage owners to sell financially binding rights via a market operated by the SO. Finally, the authors of [16] propose a framework in which the storage devices are treated as a communal asset.
There are two common threads in these approaches. The first is that they require a third party operating the storage devices, which might not necessarily be in the best interests of the storage owner. The second, and arguably more important, is that these approaches tend to drive storages out of the market. By eliminating power power, storages tend to make zero profit as their number increases, and may lead them to leave the market all together.
We take a different viewpoint by encouraging storages to form coalitions and thus achieve maximum profitability. We adopt the maximum profit as the objective for two main reasons.
Firstly, the social welfare is not easily defined at times. For instance, the maximum social welfare for all the storage units in a utility service area depends on the objective function of the utility, which does not necessary represent the least cost solution. Secondly, maximizing the profit of storage, they are encouraged to stay in the system and may lead to faster adoption of storage technologies.
This paper studies the arbitrage problem in a market setting, where multiple distributed storage units compete in a price-anticipatory manner. Due to competition, each unit's profits is lower than the profit they would obtain if they had cooperated. The contributions of this paper are two mechanisms, one distributed and one centralized, that can be used to incentivize cooperation among a group of storages. These mechanisms that do not require any individual (potentially private) information to exchanged among participants. They are: i) adding an artificial term to the cost function of each storage unit; ii) longterm cooperation via an aggregating entity. For each March 10, 2016 DRAFT of these mechanisms, we show that self-interested storage units can obtain the profit obtained by a coalition of cooperating units. We show both mechanisms can achieve the maximum possible profit.
This paper is organized as follows. In section II the market and storage models are introduced.
We also introduce two scenarios: 1) the grand coalition solution where the aggregate profit is maximized and the Nash equilibrium where each storage plays a non-cooperative game. In section III an approach to drive the profit of self-interested storages to the maximum possible profit via artificial cost functions is presented. In section IV an aggregator model is introduced and the conditions for longterm cooperation between aggregator and storages are presented. In this same section, the Nash axiomatic bargaining model is presented and used to predict the profit split that the aggregator and storages would negotiate. Section V concludes this paper.
II. MARKET AND STORAGE MODELS
In this section we describe the energy storage model and the market in which they interact.
We also lay out two different scenarios: i) one where the storages cooperate to maximize the aggregate profit, and ii) another where the storages play a non-cooperative game and individually maximize profits. We refer to the former as the grand coalition (GC) solution and to the latter as the Nash equilibrium (NE) solution.
A. Market model
The price of energy at time t, p [t] d [t] , is sensitive to energy demanded or supplied by the storages and is given by
represents the actions of all storages at time t. Let d
[t]
i ∈ R denote the energy purchased (when d
i < 0) by the i th storage at time t. The set of all storages is denoted by I and has size n. The constant β [t] is the price when the net purchases made by all storages is zero and γ [t] is a positive constant that determines the sensitivity of price to energy demand. The set of all time periods is denoted by T and has size n t .
March 10, 2016 DRAFT
B. Storage model
Storages are agents that can buy energy at some time and sell it at another. The net energy purchased and sold of every storage is required to be zero and is expressed by
Because this paper seeks to emphasize the interaction between storages, other constraints such as energy and/or power limit are modeled by a cost function associated with each storage.
The profit for the i th storage can be expressed as
where d i and d −i are the strategy choices of storage i and the strategy choices of all storages excluding storage i, respectively. We assume a bounded strategy space for all storages. The battery degradation, efficiency, and/or energy transaction costs of storage i are represented by the cost function c i (·). It is known that as the depth of discharge increases, the costs of utilizing storage increases faster than linear [17] , [18] . Throughout this paper we assume a quadratic function of the form c i (x) = ǫ i 2 x 2 that captures faster-than-linear increasing costs. The positive constant ǫ i is a storage specific cost coefficient. Now we define the GC and the NE solutions. In the GC solution
the aggregate profit of the energy storages is maximized. The dual variables of the equality constraints are denoted by λ i and the GC solution is denoted by d * .
In the NE solution
each storage maximizes its own profit given the strategy choices of all other storages. The Nash equilibrium (NE) for storage i is denoted by d ′ i . In the NE, no player has an incentive to deviate form his or her strategy. March 10, 2016 DRAFT For readability and to convey intuition about the problem we consider a two-period case throughout the rest of this section and section III. In subsection III-C we generalize our results to n t time periods.
C. Solution to the two-period GC and NE solutions
In this subsection it is shown that the NE yields a lower aggregate profit with respect to the GC strategy. This motivates the need to "fix" the NE solution. For simplicity and without loss of generality, let β
i for the two period case. A solution for the i th storage is denoted by
i . Lemma 1: As n → ∞, the aggregate profit given by the GC solution increases and approaches a finite positive number while the aggregate profit under the NE solution approaches zero.
1) Numerical example:
Throughout the numerical examples γ = 1, n = 2, and n t = 2. Both storages have cost coefficients of ǫ i = 1.
The GC solution is d * i = 1 /6 (i.e. each storage charges 1 /6 in the first period and discharges the same amount in the second period). On the other hand, the NE is d The NE oversupplies storage services with respect to the GC solution. The storages move more energy across time but the price difference between buying and selling periods is smaller and thus the NE profit is smaller. Figure 1 shows the aggregate profit for both the GC and the NE as a function of number of storages. 
Proof of Lemma 1:
i , β [2] − β [1] = 1, and n t = 2, the Lagrangian
and its Karush-KuhnMarch 10, 2016 DRAFT Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions
In the NE, no storage has the incentive to unilaterally change his or her strategy. Equivalently,
∀i ∈ I and their KKT optimality conditions
∀i ∈ I. When ǫ i > 0 ∀i ∈ I or γ > 0, the system of equations described by (5) has a unique solution. It follows that the NE is unique.
We now show that the profit under the NE approaches zero while the profit under the GC approaches 1 /4γ as the number of storages increases. The profit to be shared among the storages under the GC solution is
As n → ∞, j∈I 1 ǫ j → ∞ and the aggregate profit made by the storages under the GC solution
To show that the NE aggregate profit goes to zero as the number of storages increase, we
Then, an upper bound for aggregate profit under NE is given by
The lower bound must be non-negative as he or she can always choose d i = 0 to achieve a zero profit. It follows that as n → ∞, the aggregate profit under the NE approaches zero.
III. FIXING THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM VIA ARTIFICIAL COST FUNCTIONS
In this section we study the use of artificial cost functions (ACFs) to "fix" the NE. We would like to find a set of ACFs g
[t]
i (·) such that when the storages incur it, the NE is equal to the GC solution. The ACF is effectively a control signal that penalizes deviations from the GC solution.
We refer to the NE under the ACF as the "artificial" Nash equilibrium (ANE). Having a NE that equals the GC solution is desirable because: 1) the GC aggregate profit is larger than the NE aggregate profit, 2) it is strategically stable, and 3) it is self-enforcing [19] .
The idea of fixing an undesirable NE outcomes using a cost function was presented in [20] .
However, revenue neutrality (which we will define shortly) is not a concern in their context.
A. Nash equilibrium under artificial cost functions
The two-period profit for storage i when exposed to the ACF is
where
i (−d i ) and the ANE solution is denoted by
Lemma 2: There exists a cost function of the form
• The ANE solution of problems (6) equals the solution of problem (2) 
Moreover, the coefficients of g i (·) are given by
Note that a i and b i only depend on individual information (ǫ i ), public information (γ), and on the sum of other storages' characteristics ( j∈I
). The implication of this is that the GC solution can be reached in a distributed fashion, without the need of each storage disclosing its information to the rest of the storages.
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Proof of Lemma 2:
The coefficients of the ACF and d i must satisfy the following system of equations
Equations (7a) and (7b) ensure that in addition to satisfying each player's individual profit maximization problem, the ANE satisfies the GC solution. Equation (7c) ensures revenue neu-
, the solutions of both the GC and the NE are non-negative. Thus
It is straight forward to show that a i , b i , and d * i satisfy (7a) by using the expressions shown in Lemmas 1 and 2
. Finally, we show revenue neutrality (i.e. g i (d i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I):
B. Sensitivity analysis of the artificial cost function
In this subsection we show the ACF aggregate profit is robust to misestimations of the parameters needed to compute the ACF. Figures 2 and 3 show the effect of overestimating or underestimating i∈I
and γ, respectively, by 30% on the aggregate profit. Even with large misestimations, the GC aggregate profit remains considerably higher than the NE aggregate profit for most n. 
C. Generalization to n t time periods
In this subsection we generalize Lemma 2 to an arbitrary number of periods.
Lemma 3:
There exist a set cost functions of the form g
i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T such that:
• The ANE of problems (3) equals the solution of problem (2) 
• It is revenue neutral (i.e. t∈T g [t] i (d [t] i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I). The upper plot in Figure 4 shows the total energy purchases under both the NE and GC. The lower plot in Figure 4 shows the price under both the NE and GC in a 24 time period game. Because more energy is moved in the NE solution, the price under the NE solution, Figure 4 . The upper plot in Figure 4 shows the total energy purchases under both the NE i∈I d is n = 20 and their cost coefficients are randomly generated.
Proof of Lemma 3:
We would like to show the existence of the set of functions g
i (·). To do so, we restrict ourselves to the subset of functions whose revenue is zero for every period
i ) = 0 ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T ). Similar to the proof of Lemma 2, in order to find the coefficients of the artificial cost functions, we solve the following system of equations for d
i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T and λ i ∀i ∈ I ∂L
i ∀i ∈ I, t ∈ T (8d) March 10, 2016 DRAFT where
i , λ i ) is the Lagrangian function of the n t time periods individual profit maximization problem. Equations (8a) ensure that d [t] i satisfies the ANE. Equations (8b) ensure that the solution satisfies the GC solution while equations (8c) enforce the equality constraints of each storage.
Finally, equation (8d) ensures revenue neutrality.
The solution to the multiple period GC problem is d
∀ i ∈ I, t ∈ T and
j . It is straight forward to show that they satisfy the KKT conditions of the GC problem given by equations (8a) and (8c).
From the multiple period GC solution, when
Denote the set of such time periods as T 1 . The rest of the time periods (when d [t] i is non-positive) are in the set T 2 . We can then replace the ACF revenue neutrality requirement (8d) with
We substitute the term a
i in (8a) with either −2b
i or 2b
i depending on whether t is in T 1 or in T 2 . Finally, instead of solving the system of non-linear equations described by (8) we solve the following system of linear equations for the variables d i :
Equations (10a), (10b), and (8b) can be expressed in matrix notation as
The vector 1 ∈ R n is an all ones vector and E ∈ R n×n is a diagonal matrix whose ii th entry is ǫ i . The symbol I j ∈ R j·n×n represents j vertically concatenated identity matrices. The i th entries
i , and λ i respectively.
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We can further compact equations (10a), (10b), (8b), and (8c) to
where M ∈ R 2n·nt×2n·nt is a block diagonal matrix whose tt th block is M
0 represents equations (8c). The matrix N ∈ R n×2nt·n is constructed by horizontally concatenating I 1 Z n t times where Z ∈ R n×n all-zero matrix.
Using Gaussian elimination, it is straightforward to show that matrix
It follows that it is invertible and the system of equations (10a), (10b), (8b), and (8c) has a unique solution.
Equations (9a) and (9b) can be used to find coefficients a
i .
IV. COOPERATION VIA AGGREGATOR
In this section we explore the possibility of the storages reaching the GC solution by cooperating with a central entity that we refer to as the "aggregator." In this setting, the storages do not have access to the wholesale market but instead buy/sell energy from/to an aggregator. The aggregator determines the prices paid by/to the storages.
Previous work on aggregators [6] , [22] , [23] assume cooperation between aggregator and storages. In this work, however, we analyze possible outcomes of the aggregator-storage interaction and do not assume that the aggregator will cooperate with the storages and vice versa. The aggregator-storage game is modeled as a simultaneous move game. We show that the singleshot NE is inefficient, explore the possibility of aggregator-storage cooperation in the longterm, and derive conditions for cooperation.
A. Aggregator model
The aggregator profits by purchasing or selling energy on the wholesale market described in section II and in turn selling to or buying from the storages. For every time period, the aggregator determines the price of energy that each storage pays and the storages decide how March 10, 2016 DRAFT much to purchase from or sell to the aggregator. The prices sent by the aggregator are assumed to be bounded. The aggregator's profit from trading with player i is denoted by
where τ i and d i are the strategies of the aggregator and storage i, respectively. The strategy space of the aggregator is the set of possible price schedules that it can send to the storage.
The strategy space of each storage is the set of all feasible charge/discharge schedules and is assumed to be bounded. The energy price that storage i pays at time t is denoted by τ
B. Storage problem under an aggregator
With the aggregator acting as a middle-man between the wholesale market and the storages, the storages are insensitive to the wholesale market prices, and only respond to the prices sent by the aggregator. Let
denote the profit of the i th storage under an aggregator.
In the NE solution under an aggregator, the storage and aggregator make their strategy choices either simultaneously or without knowledge of the other player's choices. The game can be expressed as
where every player independently maximizes its own profit. The prices that the aggregator can send to the storage are bounded by τ i − τ [1] i . First we analyze the aggregator's best response given the storage's strategy. If the storage chooses It is likely that the aggregator and storages interact repeatedly over time. Thus, there might be the possibility of fostering longterm cooperation between the storages and the aggregator to achieve the GC solution. We will present a infinitely repeated game model and show under which conditions cooperation can be sustained in the longterm.
Proof of Lemma 4:
It is straight forward to show that, the storages actions, the aggregator maximizes its profit by sending price schedule
The KKT conditions of problem (11b) are
and are satisfied by d
∀t ∈ T for a given set of τ
[t]
i and λ i = 1 nt k∈T τ
[k]
i . The Nash equilibria should satisfy problems (11) . It follows the Nash equilibria is τ , and d
[t] i = 0 ∀ t ∈ T . Any other strategy choices are unstable. Since the storage does not purchase or sell energy in all Nash equilibria, the profit for both the aggregator and storage is zero.
C. Repeated game model
We assume that the single-stage game (11) is repeated indefinitely. The longterm profit made by each player is the discounted sum of the single-stage profits. Denote the longterm profit made by the aggregator from trading with storage i as 
i ).
1) Strategy space for the repeated game:
In order to keep the repeated game tractable, the strategy spaces of the aggregator and storages are reduced to specific cooperation and defection strategies.
2) Cooperation strategies:
The cooperation strategy of the aggregator is given by
It describes the strategy in which during the k th game, the aggregator sends storage i a previously agreed price scheduleτ i if storage i has played an agreedd i during all previous times. If storage i fails to uphold its commitment, the aggregator stops cooperating and plays the NE solution (τ i ) for the subsequent times the game is played. Likewise,
describes the cooperation strategy of storage i. Storage i plays an agreedd i if the aggregator has upheld its commitment to send an agreedτ i during all previous times the game has been played. If the aggregator fails to uphold its commitment, the storage i stops cooperating and plays the NE solution (d i ) for the subsequent times the game is played.
3) Defection strategies:
We now describe the defection or "cheating" strategies that the aggregator and the storage can play. We assume that all players are aware that, as described in section IV-C1, players stop cooperating when the opponent fails to uphold its commitment.
Therefore, if one of the players decides to cheat, it will do so by maximizing its single-stage profit. The aggregator's single-stage profit derived from storage i is maximized during a single game by playing
March 10, 2016 DRAFT Similarly, storage i maximizes its profit for a givenτ i during a single game by playing the defection strategy
In the following subsection we show, givend i , which choices ofτ i ensure that every player never plays its defection strategy.
D. Ensuring cooperation in an infinitely repeated game
We would like to choose aτ i (or equivalently, a profit split between storages and aggregator) such that cooperation is sustained by all players. Problems
a,i and w * i = arg sup
are solved by the aggregator and the storages, respectively, to determine when to defect (if at all). The strategy v i ∈ R + is the time the aggregator decides to defect from cooperation with storage i. Likewise, w i ∈ R + denotes the time storage i decides to stop cooperating with the aggregator. To ensure longterm cooperation, w * i = ∞ ∀i ∈ I and v * i = ∞ ∀i ∈ I. Lemma 5: Cooperation with every storage is sustained by the aggregator, or equivalently,
Here, π a (·; ·) = i∈I π a,i (·; ·). The vectord n:n denotes a vector of storage actions in which storages i < n play their NE and storage n cooperates. Similarly,τ n:n denotes a vector of aggregator actions in which it plays the NE with storages i < n and cooperates with storage n. The vector τ Dn represents the action of the aggregator where τ
Dn i
= τ i ∀i < n (i.e. NE),
e. defection strategy). Similarly, cooperation is sustained by storage i, or equivalently, 
1) Numerical example:
Consider a repeated aggregator-storage game with the same aggregator and storages described in the previous examples. We assume that the discount rate is δ = 0.95.
As it will be shown in Lemma 6, the aggregator and storages agree on the GC solution:d i = 1 − 0.95
is maximized. The aggregator maximizes its longterm profit by choosing to not cooperate (i.e.
is greater than zero. And chooses to cooperate indefinitely (i.e.v i = ∞) if
is less than zero. Whenτ cooperation between all players can be interpreted as a share in profits between the aggregator and the storages. In the subsection that follows we use Nash's axiomatic bargaining model to predict that the aggregator and the storage will agree on the GC solution and that the profit will be split equally among them when all players are risk neutral.
Proof of Lemma 5:
First we show that for the aggregator to sustain cooperation with storage i,τ i must be in the set A 
where τ D j denotes the action of the aggregator where τ Similarly,τ j:n denotes a vector of aggregator actions in which it plays the NE with storages i < j and cooperate with i ≥ j. It is assumed that the set of storages I is ordered such that
We can use the identity
Since v 0 = −1, δ v 0 +1 = δ −1+1 = 1 and defining π a (τ n+1:n ;d n+1:n ) ≡ 0, equation (13) can be rewritten as
and the aggregator maximizes longterm profits, for the aggregator to choose v j = ∞, α j must be less than or equal to zero.
Of all possible orderings of the set I and d * i ≥ 0 ∀ i ∈ I,τ j it is most constrained when j = n, that is, when the least amount of players are in the market 1 . Thus, in order for the aggregator to maintain cooperation with storage n, π a (τ n:n ;d n: 
i ) can be expressed as
Using the identity
, equation (14) can be expressed as
For storage i to indefinitely sustain cooperation with the aggregator, the term 
E. Profit split via Nash Bargaining
As shown previously, there are potentially infinitely many ways to split the profit and ensure cooperation. In this section we use John Nash's bargaining model to predict the profit split between the aggregator and the storage. We restrict our analysis to cases where A i = ∅ ∀i ∈ I. 1) The Nash bargaining problem: In this subsection, we introduce Nash's axiomatic approach to bargaining [24] . Denote the set of possible bargaining outcomes of the aggregator and storage i as S i and the solution to the bargaining problem as ξ (S i ). Under Nash's assumptions a bargaining solution is a single point in a set of possible outcomes that satisfies the following axioms: 
• Independence of irrelevant alternatives: In this analysis, the aggregator is assumed to independently bargain with each storage. This assumption is reasonable because, by the Pareto efficiency axiom, the agreed storage actions will be the GC solution (i.e.d i = d * i ). Then, the only thing that is left for negotiation is the price schedules sent to each storage. The price schedule sent to a storage does not affect other storages.
Lemma 6: If both players are risk neutral the aggregator and storage i will agree on aτ i that equally splits the GC profit and fosters longterm cooperation.
By agreeing to act under the coordination of an aggregator, the storages share some of the profit with the aggregator who is essentially a middle man. However, as seen in figure 5 , as the number of storages increases, splitting the GC profit with an aggregator rather than obtaining the NE profit becomes increasingly lucrative.
It is worth noting that, as shown by [25] , if one of the players is more risk adverse than the other, its share of the profit will decrease. Conversely, if a player is more risk-loving than the other, its share of the profit will increase. It follows that the aggregator longterm profit that the aggregator derives from trading with storage i is π Normalizing by the total profit to be shared, π total , the longterm utility of the aggregator from cooperating with storage i can be written as:ũ .
V. CONCLUSION
We studied the profit of a group of energy storages under competition and cooperation. We showed that without cooperation, the aggregate profit of the storages approaches zero as the number of storages grows. We presented two approaches to foster cooperation. In the first approach, storages are exposed to artificial cost functions, and their self-interested strategy maximizes the aggregate profit. In the second approach, the aggregate profit is maximized with the help of an aggregator. The interaction of the aggregator and storages is modeled as a simultaneous move game whose Nash equilibrium is undesirable. We derive the conditions (i.e. profit split between aggregator and storages) that ensure aggregator-storage cooperation.
Finally, we use Nash's axiomatic approach to bargaining to predict that risk-neutral players will equally split the available profit.
